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PANEL I:  Trademark Dilution: Moseley 
and Beyond 
Moderator: Barton Beebe∗ 
Panelists: Cecelia Dempsey† 
 Marie Driscoll‡ 
 Hugh C. Hansen§ 
 Susan Progoff|| 
 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: I was honored to be invited to moderate 
this panel.  When I found out who was going to be on it, I was not 
only honored, but also very excited to show up today and hear the 
comments about trademark dilution.  This is a burning issue in 
trademark law, and there is no better place to discuss it than in 
New York, with New York lawyers who are practitioners of 
trademark and who are really the top of their profession.  So, this is 
a real treat. 
What I’ll do right now is introduce who is on this panel, and 
then I’ll say maybe sixty seconds on what this case is about.  The 
subject of our case study, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., was 
handed down by the Supreme Court in March 2003.1  Then we’ll 
move on to a little history of dilution and a pro-and-con discussion 
of dilution.  Professor Hansen will conclude with the future of 
dilution. 
So, who is on this panel?  Cecelia Dempsey is a graduate of 
Fordham University School of Law and is currently Senior 
 
∗  Professor, Cardozo School of Law.  B.A., University of Chicago, 1992; Ph.D., 
Princeton University, 1998; J.D., Yale Law School, 2000. 
†  Senior Trademark Counsel, Corporate Services, Altria Corporation.  B.A., University 
of Notre Dame, 1982; J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1985. 
‡  Partner, Fross Zelnick Lehrman & Driscoll, P.C.  B.S., summa cum laude, 
Georgetown University, 1960; LL.B, Harvard Law School, 1963. 
§ Professor, Fordham University School of Law.  A.B., Rutgers University, 1968; J.D., 
Georgetown University Law Center, 1972; L.L.M., Yale Law School, 1977. 
||  Partner, Fish & Neave.  B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1974; M.S., University of 
Florida, 1976; J.D., cum laude, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1979. 
 1 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
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Trademark Counsel at Altria Corporate Services, Inc.  Marie 
Driscoll is a partner at Fross Zelnick Lehrman & Zissu, P.C., a 
premier intellectual property firm in New York, and thus, in the 
nation, and argued in front of the Supreme Court in Inwood Labs, 
Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc.,2 which is a really important trademark case.  
Sue Progoff is a partner at Fish & Neave, another premier 
intellectual property firm in New York.  Professor Hugh Hansen 
needs no introduction, I think, in these circles.  He is a professor 
here at Fordham and is a prominent name, especially in issues 
relating to international intellectual property law. 
Let me say a few words about what this case is about and its 
history, and then we can get right into a discussion of the doctrine 
of trademark dilution.  This case began in 1998,3 and it has these 
bizarre facts in which an Army colonel was offended by an 
advertisement he received.4  It was an advertisement for a store in 
Kentucky that was called Victor’s Secret.5  This was a store that 
sold, among other things, lingerie and adult toys and various other 
devices, which the Supreme Court describes at length in a footnote 
in this opinion.6  Yet, he was not necessarily offended by the 
content of these devices or their obscenity or indecency.7  He was 
offended, however, as he wrote in a letter to Victoria’s Secret, by 
the unfair trade practices of the Victor’s Secret store.8  He thought 
it was unfair that they were appropriating some of the goodwill or 
commercial energy of the Victoria’s Secret catalogue.9 
Well, Victoria’s Secret got this letter, and their lawyers 
responded.  They filed a claim for, among other things, trademark 
confusion.10  Here, trademark confusion is confusion of consumers 
as to source.  For example, if I were to walk up to Victor’s Secret 
store and think it is somehow affiliated with Victoria’s Secret.  
 
 2 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
 3 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1092 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 
2000), aff’d, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d and remanded, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 4 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See id. at 424 n.4. 
 7 See id. at 423. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See id. 
 10 See id. 
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This is also dilution of the uniqueness and distinctiveness of the 
Victoria’s Secret trademark.11  As I understand it, at the district 
court level Victoria’s Secret won on all claimshowever, I could 
be wrong.12  At the Sixth Circuit, the district court opinion was 
affirmed.13  Here, the main issue, which eventually came before 
the Supreme Court, was whether the plaintiff in an anti-dilution 
action has to show merely a likelihood of dilution or, rather, actual 
dilution.14 
In the consumer confusion context, all that is required is a 
showing of a likelihood of confusion.15  The problem is that the 
Lanham Act16 appears to say that you must show actual dilution in 
order to receive an injunction based on dilution.17  The Fourth 
Circuit, as an example of a circuit that had gone the other way, said 
that a plaintiff must show actual dilution.18  The Sixth Circuit said 
that a plaintiff need only show a likelihood of dilution.19 
The case went before the Supreme Court, and the conclusion of 
the Court was that the plaintiff must show actual dilution, which—
and I think most people would agree—is an extremely hard 
standard to meet.20  Since this case, the trademark bar has 
considered various ways to legislatively overrule this case.21 
 
 11 See id. at 423–24. 
 12 See Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095–96 (ruling in favor of Victoria’s Secret 
on its dilution claim only, and in defendants’ favor on issues of both trademark confusion 
and infringement). 
 13 Moseley, 259 F.3d 464. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2003) (providing that any person who uses in commerce 
“any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in 
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or 
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion . . . shall be 
liable in a civil action”). 
 16 Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act], Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2003)). 
 17 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432–33 (noting that the Lanham Act, as amended by the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”),  “unambiguously requires a showing of 
actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution” in order to obtain injunctive relief). 
 18 See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows Inc. v. Utah Div. of 
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460–65 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 19 Moseley, 259 F.3d at 475–76. 
 20 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433. 
 21 For a discussion of recent criticism since Moseley was decided, see Brian A. Jacobs, 
Note, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (2004) 
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So, that is a very short introduction.  We’ll talk more about the 
details of the case. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Let me just say one thing.  The 
district court actually granted summary judgment against 
Victoria’s Secret on the trademark infringement and unfair 
competition claims.22 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Right. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: That was not appealed.  All that went 
up on appeal to the Sixth Circuit was dilution.23 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Right, just blurring dilution, which 
we’ll get into.  I will just leave it there and we can get into that 
during our discussion.  So, with that brief introduction, let’s move 
on to the history of the concept of trademark dilution.  I’ll turn it 
over to Marie Driscoll. 
MS. DRISCOLL: My task here is to talk about the history of 
trademark protection so that we can hopefully determine two 
things.  First, how dilution came to be a concept of interest to 
trademark owners and, second, why courts have had such a very 
difficult time in applying the law. 
I’ll go back, first, to the Act of 1905, which is the federal 
trademark statute that the United States operated under from 1905 
to 1946.24  At that time, the standard for civil actions was that a 
defendant would be liable if it made a colorable imitation of a 
trademark affixed to goods of substantially the same descriptive 
properties as those of the trademark owner.25  As you can see, this 
is very narrow.  If you used a trademark for an automobile, you 
 
(stating that the Supreme Court’s decision is inadequate to remedy the problems of the 
FTDA).  Jacobs proposes that 
[c]ourts should begin by asking whether consumers will mentally associate the 
defendant’s mark with the plaintiff’s mark, but the analysis should not end 
there.  Courts should go on to ask, first, whether the junior mark adequately 
distinguishes itself from the senior mark and, second, whether the junior mark’s 
reference to the senior mark provides useful information. 
Id. at 165. 
 22 See Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095–96. 
 23 See Moseley, 259 F.3d at 466. 
 24 Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, ch. 104, 33 Stat. 724 (1905). 
 25 See id. 
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could stop someone else from using essentially the same mark on 
an automobile, but the law didn’t go much beyond that.26 
Trademark owners started to chafe against these limits to 
protection.  During the 1920s, two things happened.  One is that a 
lawyer named Frank Schechter, who happened to be trademark 
counsel for the BVD Company, and presumably was motivated 
because he was not getting the kind of protection he wanted for his 
famous BVD mark, wrote an article called “The Rational Basis of 
Trademark Protection.”27  As a result, he is generally considered to 
be the father of dilution.28 
Schechter argued that trademark law previously had been 
perceived as needing to prevent the deception of consumers, 
which, of course, is always one aspect of trademark law.29  In other 
words, if you go in to buy a Buick car, you expect it to be from the 
same company that you purchased a Buick car from five years ago.  
Here, protection exists for the consumer.  It was also generally 
considered that trademarks did not exist in gross.30  In other words, 
a trademark was not a piece of property, like a book or a record.31  
It signified something.  You couldn’t steal a trademark.  You had 
to fit it into the concepts of likelihood of confusion.32 
Schechter saw trademarks in a somewhat different light.  In his 
article, he spoke of the value of a modern trademark being in its 
selling power.33  He explained that the selling power depends on 
the psychological hold of that trademark upon the public.  This 
grasp signifies not only the merit of the goods on which the 
 
 26 See id. 
 27 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813, 825 (1926) (urging that trademarks be protected against even trivial non-competing 
uses of the mark, which over time would cause a “gradual whittling away or dispersion of 
the identity . . . of the mark”). 
 28 See, e.g., Mathias Strasser, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection Revisited: 
Putting the Dilution Doctrine Into Context, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 375, 377 (2000) (observing that the “idea of protecting trademarks in the absence of 
a likelihood of confusion on the part of consumers began with an article that Frank 
Schechter wrote for the Harvard Law Review in 1927”). 
 29 See Schechter, supra note 27, at 816, 819. 
 30 See id. at 818. 
 31 See id. 
 32 See id. at 818, 821. 
 33 See id. at 831. 
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trademark is used, but also the uniqueness and singularity of the 
trademark.34  In other words, if you thought of Buick, all you 
thought of was an automobile; you didn’t think of anything else.35 
Schechter also took the next step, which is the basis of what we 
now consider dilution, namely that “the uniqueness of the mark is 
impaired if others use it on either related goods or non-related 
goods.”36 
And finally, not all marks are entitled to this kind of protection.  
The degree of protection, Schechter noted, “depends on the extent 
to which, through the efforts of its owner, the mark is actually 
unique and different from other marks.”37  I might add that in 
analyzing the issue, Schechter presented examples of famous 
marks that would be entitled to dilution protection, including some 
that we still know eighty years later, such as Rolls Royce, Aunt 
Jemima, and Kodak.38  Of course, he also came up with something 
called Blue Goose and Nujol, but they have fallen by the 
wayside.39 
But the point is that there are some marks that, in his view and 
in the view of many courts, are such household words, so unique 
and famous, that you don’t have to prove that consumers are going 
to think that you, the trademark owner, are responsible for the 
defendant’s product, have licensed it, are associated with it, and 
somehow have authorized it.40  The theory is that if you have a 
trademark of that stature, you should be entitled to protect it 
against all use.41 
 
 34 See id. 
 35 See id. at 818–19. 
 36 Id. at 831. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See id. at 829. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See id. at 831 (arguing that the “preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should 
constitute the only rational basis for its protection”). 
 41 See id. at 828–31 (concluding that broader protection should be given to coined, 
arbitrary or fanciful words or phrases, which are “associated in the public mind with a 
particular product” and arguing that a mark’s “uniqueness or singularity is vitiated or 
impaired by its use upon either related on non-related goods”). 
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Now, about the same time in 1928, Learned Hand wrote a 
decision in a case called Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson.42  The 
plaintiff in that case used Yale on locks, and the defendant started 
to use Yale on flashlights.43  These are not goods of the same 
descriptive quality.44  In his opinion, however, Judge Hand upheld 
the protection of Yale Lock’s name, even though he had to cope 
with a statute that said that the goods had to be of “substantially 
the same descriptive properties.”45  In doing so, he said a lot about 
trademarks that plaintiffs love to quote even today, again eighty 
years later.  Judge Hand said that 
it has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may 
have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark 
outside the field of his own exploitation to justify 
interposition by a court.  His mark is his authentic seal; by 
it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his 
name for good or ill.  If another uses it, he borrows the 
owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within has 
own control.  This is an injury, even though the borrower 
does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a 
reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and 
creator, and another can use it only as a mask.  And so it 
has come to be recognized that, unless the borrower’s use is 
so foreign to the owner’s as to insure against any 
identification of the two, it is unlawful.46 
So, he hasn’t gone the whole way, as Schechter did, to protect 
against unrelated goods, but Judge Hand did give a germ of an idea 
to other courts that allowed for considerable broadening of the 
breadth of protection that one would get under the Act of 1905.47  
 
 42 26 F.2d 972, 973–74 (2d Cir. 1928) (holding that flashlight manufacturer’s attempt 
to register a mark containing the word “Yale” was properly refused). 
 43 See id. at 973. 
 44 See id. at 974. 
 45 See id.; see also Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, ch. 104, 33 Stat. 724 
(1905). 
 46 Yale Elec., 26 F.2d at 974 (citing Wall v. Rolls-Royce, 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925); 
Akron-Overland v. Willys-Overland, 273 F. 674 (3d Cir. 1921); Vogue Co. v. 
Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924); Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney, 
247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917)). 
 47 Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, ch. 104, 33 Stat. 724 (1905). 
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Now, several things happened in accordance with this attempt to 
broaden the protection to which trademark owners were entitled. 
First, the Lanham Act was amended in 1946.48  Under this 
revision, the requirement that goods be of substantially the same 
descriptive properties was eliminated.  A trademark owner was 
entitled to protection when his or her mark or a similar mark was 
placed on goods or services, and the use was “likely to cause 
confusion, mistake, or deception.”49  That is one of the principles 
that is still part of our federal trademark act. 
There was no impetus, however, toward any kind of federal 
dilution act.  Instead, in 1946 Congress added section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act,50 which some people consider a federal law of unfair 
competition, but which has proved to be the vehicle by which 
courts have steadily broadened the scope of protection for 
trademark owners. 
Originally, section 43(a) prohibited use of “false designations 
of origin” and “false descriptions” or representations about goods 
or services.51  This initially went into the Lanham Act to prevent 
use of, for example, the word “Idaho” on potatoes that weren’t 
from Idaho.52  One of the famous marks banned under section 
43(a) was “Glass Wax” for a glass cleaner that did not contain 
wax.53  This statute was broadened considerably by courts, and the 
courts began to hold that false designation of origin and false 
descriptions as to source included the use of trademarks that falsely 
would suggest or indicate to people that the goods were from the 
same origin as the first user.  In other words, it’s a slightly broader 
reading of the straight infringement part of the statute. 
 
 48 Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1051–1129 (2003)). 
 49 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
 50 See Lanham Act §43(a). 
 51 Id. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 939–40 (D.D.C. 1955) (holding that 
the words “glass wax” for a glass cleaner and polish that contained no wax were 
deceptively misdescriptive under the Lanham Act). 
2 PANEL I FORMAT 8/6/2004  2:57 PM 
2004] MOSELEY AND BEYOND 857 
 
The Trademark Law Revision Act subsequently changed the 
law to recognize the progress made by courts.54  The reason I am 
going to mention this is because the revised statute, in my mind, 
gives a very considerable amount of protection to famous marks.  
Under the new section 43(a), a term that is likely to cause 
confusion or mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, 
or association of such person with another is actionable.55  These 
are very, very broad concepts. 
I see that I don’t have much time left.  But to go back to strict 
dilution, while the federal government was not interested, several 
states passed dilution statutes.  Right now, we have fifteen states 
that only require a showing of likelihood of dilution.56  One of 
them, Texas, does not even require that the mark be famous.57  
Thirteen states have absolutely no dilution protection by statute.58  
Twenty-two states have passed a model state law that has the same 
dilution language as the federal law that just has been interpreted 
in Moseley, and therefore, suffer from the same problems as the 
federal statute.59 
There was a groundswell in the 1980s by the trademark bar to 
get a federal dilution statute.60  Sometimes when you get your wish 
you are sorry afterward.  And I think that probably has happened in 
this instance because of the particular way in which the statute has 
been interpreted.  Originally, when the trademark law was revised 
 
 54 See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 
(1988) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2003)). 
 55 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 56 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., the 
Internet, and Intell. Prop., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of the Honorable Howard L. 
Berman), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/berman021402.htm (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2004). 
 57 See Texas Anti-Dilution Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 2004). 
 58 See Int’l Trademark Ass’n, US State Chart of Anti-Dilution Statutes, available at 
http://www.inta.org/policy/mstb_antidilution.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). 
 59 See, e.g., Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug?  Dilution Protection for “Famous” 
Trademarks: Anti-Competitive “Monopoly” or Earned “Property” Right?, 47 FLA. L. 
REV. 653, 656 n.12 (1995). 
 60 See Gale R. Peterson, Overview of Intellectual Property, in UNDERSTANDING THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 2003, at 11, 179 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, 
& Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-01BF, 2003) (noting that First 
Amendment violation concerns prevented a federal anti-dilution statute in 1988). 
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to add an “intent to use” section, there was also a proposal before 
Congress that dilution be added.61  There was a lot of resistance 
from the media because it was afraid that the statute could be 
interpreted to limit First Amendment rights, and thus, Congress 
wouldn’t even look at it.62  Years later, in the 1990s, Congress 
revisited the issue and the present statute was passed.63 
Since then, the courts have had a lot of difficulty in dealing 
with the dilution statute.64  This is possibly because the entire 
history of marks protection had caused confusion or required proof 
of association or affiliation.65  There have been cases in which 
courts have had to face the issue of whether or not fame in a niche 
market is sufficient.66  There have been cases in which the courts 
have had to consider whether they can protect a famous mark that 
is not inherently distinctive as opposed to one that required a 
finding of secondary meaning.67  The cases have been all over the 
place, even within circuits. 
I’ll end by saying that I was involved in the first dilution case 
that was decided by the Second Circuit.68  It involved crackers in 
the shape of fish.69  The Pepperidge Farm people claimed that use 
of a fish by Nabisco was an infringement and a dilution of their 
rights in the fish.70 
 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-1028 (1988)). 
 63 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000). 
 64 See, e.g., Julie C. Frymark, Trademark Dilution: A Proposal to Stop the Infection 
From Spreading, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 165, 187–202 (2003) (reviewing cases that involve 
dilution statutes). 
 65 Id. 
 66 See, e.g., Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 505 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that as a matter of law, Zazu’s hair products sales were “insufficient to establish national 
trademark rights” when L’Oreal placed its similar hair care products on the market). 
 67 See, e.g., Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 789 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (affirming the district court’s decision that although the “Fish-Fri” mark had 
acquired secondary meaning, the “defendants were entitled to use the term ‘fishfry’ under 
the fair use doctrine as a descriptive characteristic of the product”). 
 68 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that there was 
a likelihood of success for defendants’ counterclaim concerning trademark infringement). 
 69 See id. at 212. 
 70 See id. at 213–14. 
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In this case, Pepperidge Farm was not able to get a registration 
of its fish without showing secondary meaning.  Indeed, with 
configurations of a product, such as the shape of a fish, you have to 
show secondary meaning.71  The court nonetheless gave protection 
to the fish under the dilution statute.72  A few years later, the same 
court held, in another case involving “The Children’s Place,” that it 
would not give protection under the federal dilution statute to a 
trademark that had to show secondary meaning and was not 
inherently distinctive.73 
So, as you can seeand this is only a very small 
picturethere has been chaos in the way that courts have tried to 
wrestle with a statute that, frankly, has concepts in it that they are 
not used to; that suggests protection of a trademark in gross, 
something that has been drilled into their heads for years, as not 
appropriate; that treats trademark as a property right and goes 
beyond protection of consumers from confusion.  The courts are 
having a tremendous time wrestling with this concept. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Cecelia? 
MS. DEMPSEY: I’m not sorry that there is a federal dilution 
cause of action.  I believe that dilution is very real.  One of my jobs 
as a corporate lawyer is to protect some famous marks.  I think 
dilution is very real, and it is very damaging; it’s just hard to 
prove.  And if there is a damage out there, I think that there should 
be a cause of action to protect it. 
Just like Marie, I’m sitting here with Frank Schechter’s 
article.74  I’m thinking that I must have a hard argument to make if 
I’m relying on a 1927 law review article as my main argument. 
But, as Frank Schechter said, “[I]f ‘Kodak’ may be used for 
bathtubs and cakes, ‘Mazda’ for cameras and shoes, or ‘Ritz 
 
 71 See id. at 215–16. 
 72 See id. at 228–29. 
 73 TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Communications Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 96–97 (2d Cir. 
2000) (holding that the FTDA protects a narrower range of marks than does the Lanham 
Act and that acquired distinctiveness does not fulfill the distinctiveness requirement of 
the FTDA). 
 74 See Schechter, supra note 27. 
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Carlton’ for coffee, these marks must inevitably be lost in the 
commonplace words of the language, despite the originality and 
the ingenuity of their contrivance.”75 
I think, as Frank Schechter stated, “[I]t’s the mark that actually 
sells the goods, and, self-evidently, the more distinctive the mark, 
the more effective is its selling power.”76  I think that is what the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act represented, that selling power.77  
To the extent your trademark protects goods that may be more of a 
commodity.  I think that the selling power of that mark is that 
much more important. 
There are really two types of harm, types of dilution.  One is 
blurring, which is the whittling-away or the dispersion of the 
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name on 
non-competing or competing goods.78  There is also tarnishment, 
which is the degradation or dilution of the distinctive quality of the 
mark.79 
It is important that dilution relief be limited to famous and 
distinctive marks.  For example, United Airlines, which is not 
necessarily a very distinctive mark, may not be entitled to the same 
dilution protection as some other, more distinctive famous marks. 
I think also, as Marie was touching upon, we should not be 
giving dilution relief in particular niches.  I think that the courts 
got into trouble when they were finding a cause of action for 
dilution in a particular niche market.  In these cases, you really had 
to be familiar with, for example, computers, motorcycles, maybe 
golf clubs, or something like that to truly know if the mark in 
question was famous. 
 
 75 Id. at 830. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000). 
 78 See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 
(2d Cir. 1989) (defining blurring as “the whittling away of an established trademark’s 
selling power and value through its unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar marks”) 
(citing Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d, 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
 79 See id. at 1031; see also Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 
1994) (stating that “‘tarnishment’ generally arises when the plaintiff’s trademark is linked 
to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context 
likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner’s product”). 
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Since Moseley has been decided it is much more difficult for 
trademark owners to prove dilution.  Obviously, the Court left 
open in Moseley the notion that if the marks were the same 
whether you could show dilution through circumstantial 
evidence.80  My evidence is that since Moseley there have been 
several cases.81  About half found sufficient evidence of actual 
dilution,82 and the other half found that the burden of proof had not 
been met.83 
Of those that were successful in proving actual dilution, all 
were based upon circumstantial evidence, so that the marks were 
considered either identical or virtually identical.84  I think that the 
courts should have some leeway in terms of what is identical.  It 
shouldn’t be a situation, like in Europe, with the Office of 
Harmonization for Internal Markets, where it has to be the exact 
mark.85  I think that if it is a close similarity—there should be a 
determination that the marks are the same or similar—it is enough 
to show actual dilution through circumstantial evidence. 
I think that the Supreme Court in Moseley left open the notion 
that you could show actual dilution, leaving it to the practitioners 
to show it.86  Certainly, to the extent that the marks were not the 
same, the Court suggested that one could show actual dilution.  
The Court sent us to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Ringling 
Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division 
 
 80 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003). 
 81 Cf. Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 
Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2003); Enterprise Rent-A-Car 
Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Scott Fetzer 
Co. v. Gehring, 288 F. Supp. 2d 696, 702 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. 
Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1893 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 82 Cf. Scott Fetzer Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d at 702; Pinehurst, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 431. 
 83 Cf. Nitro Leisure Prods., 341 F.3d 1356; Kellogg Co., 337 F.3d 616; Enterprise 
Rent-A-Car Co., 330 F.3d 1333, 1338; Savin Corp., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1893. 
 84 Cf. Scott Fetzer Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d at 702 (noting that the defendant’s marks are 
identical to those of the plaintiff); Pinehurst, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 428 (stating that 
defendant’s marks are indisputably identical to plaintiff’s federal service marks). 
 85 The Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market was established by an European 
Community Council Regulation on December 20, 1993 to carry out registration 
procedures for European Community trademarks. See Office for Harmonization in the 
Internal Mkt., at http://oami.eu.int/en (last updated Mar. 29, 2004). 
 86 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433. 
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of Travel Development.87  First, dilution can be shown through 
actual loss of revenues if you prove that there was some sort of 
nexus there.88  This would be very, very difficult to do.  Second, 
the other way was through a carefully constructed consumer 
survey, which would demonstrate not only a mental association, 
but also that there was some sort of harm, some whittling-away of 
the mark.89  Finally, you could use contextual factors, which I 
consider the Polaroid factors,90 as long as there was some sort of 
other proof.91  So, there had to be a complement to some other 
proof. 
But I think that this opens the door to other ways of proving 
actual dilution.  From what I understand, they really have not used 
consumer surveys to show this because it is going to be very 
difficult to show a whittling-away in the context of consumer 
surveys. 
People may want to use the testimonyand I think that it has 
been done in at least in one caseof a marketing expert to show 
there has been or will be a whittling-away of the uniqueness of the 
mark if the junior user’s mark is allowed to continue even on non-
competing goods.92 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Okay.  I think we’ll go directly to Sue 
for, as I understand it, the “con” view on dilution. 
MS. PROGOFF: Okay.  I disagree with some of the things Ceil 
said. 
 
 87 See id. (citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. 
of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460–65 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 88 See id. 
 89 See id. at 427 n.6, 434 (citing Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 464). 
 90 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (listing 
factors tending to show a likelihood: “the strength of [the plaintiff’s mark], the degree of 
similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the 
prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good 
faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication 
of the buyers.”). 
 91 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 427 n.6 (citing Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 457, 464–65). 
 92 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 
(9th Cir. 2004); Mark Bric Display Corp. v. Joseph Struhl Co., 2003 WL 21696318, at *7 
(D.R.I. July 9, 2003); see also Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 
1548 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff’d, 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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The federal dilution law, as it is currently written, really 
doesn’t accomplish what it was intended to accomplish.  Courts 
have difficulty applying it.  I think practitioners don’t really know 
what they need to prove in order to prevail.  What ended up 
happening in many of the cases, where courts have granted an 
injunction under the dilution statute,93 they also granted an 
injunction under either section 43(a)94 or the trademark 
infringement section of the Lanham Act.95  In other words, people 
were still proving that there was a likelihood of confusion.  
Because there has kind of been a blurring, if you’ll pardon the 
term, between the infringement and unfair competition portions of 
the statute and the dilution sections of the statute, it really has left 
the law as kind of mishmash, where people don’t really know 
where they stand. 
Generally, if you are truly dealing with a famous trademark, 
you can show that there is a likelihood of confusion in the way that 
that term has been interpreted over the yearsin other words, 
confusion as to source, confusion as to sponsorship, confusion as 
to approval or endorsement.  Additionally, the products do not 
need to be closely related for that to happen.  I think that the way 
marketing has evolved since Frank Schechter wrote his article 
makes it much easier for trademark owners to show there is a 
likelihood of confusion.96 
Let me just talk a little bit about how trademark usage has 
changed.  In the last twenty years or so, corporate licensing has 
become a major factor in the trademark arena.97  Twenty years ago, 
you only saw licensing of entertainment-type trademarks, sports 
trademarks, and designer names; there really wasn’t much beyond 
that.  This has totally changed.  Corporate licensing is now a 
 
 93 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 [FTDA], Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 
985 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1) (2003)). 
 94 Lanham Act § 43(a). 
 95 Lanham Act § 32. 
 96 See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1029, 
1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing some of the products Schechter utilized in his article). 
 97 See Allan Feldman, What Every Trademark Attorney Should Know About Business 
Motivations, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 47, 47–48 (1996) (“Corporate trademark licensing . . . 
has been moving from what was historically a marginal, ancillary activity to what is now 
a mainstream corporate business tool.”). 
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multibillion-dollar industry.98  I think that consumers have come to 
understand that trademarks are not necessarily used only on the 
core products but they also can be used on other products that are 
extensions. 
Let me give you some examples.  In the old days, designer 
trademarks were used primarily on clothing.99  Sometimes, you 
would see them on shoes or handbags, but not much beyond that.  
Today, you see designer names from the clothing field going over 
into fragrances, cosmetics, towels, sheets, furniture, and other 
kinds of household products.100  So, there is a broad array of things 
that consumers have come to associate with the source of a 
clothing product. 
Think about a brand like Eddie Bauer.  Eddie Bauer is 
primarily a brand of clothing.  It is also used as a service mark for 
clothing stores and for a catalogue that sells primarily clothing.101  
But it is also licensed as a trademark to be used on cars, on 
SUVs.102  So, it has gone beyond the scope of what its core brand 
is into something that is really totally unrelated. 
 
 98 See, e.g., Anjali Kapur, Government-Unique Marks: From Star Wars to Joint Strike 
Fighters, 32 PUB. CONT. L. J. 141, 145–46 (2002).  In 1997, lessors of intangible assets, 
except copyrighted works, had an industry-wide annual sales volume of 11,263,865,000 
according to the U.S. census. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1997 ECONOMIC CENSUS, available 
at http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/industry/E533110.HTM (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). 
 99 See generally  Susan Heller Anderson, The Big Couture Rip-Off, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
1981, § 6, at 62 (discussing the struggles of designer clothing companies such as 
Christian Dior, Louis Vuitton, and Coco Chanel to protect their trademarks). 
 100 See generally Warren Berger, Licensing for Fun and Profit—and Free Exposure, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1988, at F13 (describing the vast potential and profitability of 
licensing of consumer products).  For example, Giorgio Armani, traditionally a clothing 
designer, offers a variety of products from fragrances to home décor. See Giorgio 
Armani, at http://www.giorgioarmani.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). 
 101 According to the Eddie Bauer Web site, “Eddie Bauer has become an international, 
multi-channel company with catalogs, over 425 stores and an award-winning web site.” 
Eddie Bauer, Company Background, at http://www.eddiebauer.com/about/company-
_info/company_background.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). 
 102 Ford currently sells a model of its Explorer SUV under the Eddie Bauer name. See 
Ford Explorer, Explorer Eddie Bauer, at http://www.fordvehicles.com/suvs/-
explorer/glance/index.asp#Explorer_Eddie_Bauer (last visited Mar. 31, 2004); see also 
Greg Wilson, Test Drive: 2003 Ford Expedition Eddie Bauer, CanadianDriver, at 
http://www.canadiandriver.com/testdrives/03expedition2.htm (Sept. 20, 2002). 
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Think about Coca-Cola.  Coca-Cola was one of the first brands 
that was licensed from a corporate perspective to a whole line of 
products.103  It started out as a soft drink.104  They opened up a 
store where they had clothing, toys, bottle openers, and mouse 
pads; you name it, they have a product with the Coke logo and the 
Coca Cola trademark on it.105 
Another example is Harley-Davidson, well known for 
motorcycles.  But the trademark is also used on restaurants and 
clothing.106  Or even think about Buick, the classic example of why 
we need dilution.107  I don’t know what Buick has done with their 
trademark, but most car manufacturers now have huge licensing 
programs.108  They send out catalogues.  In the dealerships, they 
have a store where they sell all kinds of things like clothing, 
jewelry, and luggage, which are totally unrelated to cars, but have 
the trademark on them.109 
In view of that kind of environment, it’s not difficult if you 
have a really famous trademark—which is what the dilution statute 
is intended to protect—to show that if it’s used on an unrelated 
 
 103 Constance L. Hays, No More Brand X; Licensing of Names Adds to Image and 
Profit, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1998, at D1 (describing Cola-Cola as a “success story that 
has touched off a thousand other licensing ventures”). 
 104 The Coca-Cola Company is “the world’s leading manufacturer, marketer, and 
distributor of nonalcoholic beverage concentrates and syrups, used to produce nearly 400 
beverage brands . . . in over 200 countries around the world.”  Coca-Cola Company, at 
http://www.coca-cola.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). 
 105 Coca-Cola sells several of these products through its online store. See coca-
colastore.com, at http://www.coca-colastore.com/b2c/process/Index.pasp (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2004). 
 106 For an example of the various products Harley-Davidson offers, see Harley-
Davidson USA at http://www.harley-davidson.com/pr/en/products.asp (last visited Mar. 
31, 2004). 
 107 See Schechter, supra note 27, at 825 (setting forth the foundation of dilution law by 
recognizing that trademarks could extend beyond indicators of the source of goods and 
focusing on the value of the uniqueness of the trademark as free standing embodiments of 
quality and value, worthy themselves of independent protection). 
 108 See Buick, Apparel & Accessories Collection, at http://www.buickattire.com/-
catalog/default.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2004) (offering Buick-marked goods unrelated to 
its automobiles such as shirts, hats, and gym bags); see also Mercedez-Benz, The 
Collection, at http://www.thecollection.mbusa.com/collection/templates/index.jsp (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2004) (offering goods with the Mercedez-Benz trademark such as silver 
ballpoint pens, women’s diamond watches, and leather briefcases). 
 109 See supra note 108. 
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product, an appreciable number of consumers are likely to think 
that there is some approval, affiliation, licensing relationship, or 
some kind of connection.  The product may not necessarily be 
manufactured by the manufacturer of the core product, but it is at 
least approved or licensed in some way. 
That kind of proof will get you an injunction under either 
section 43(a)110 or the trademark infringement provision111 of the 
Lanham Act.  In view of that, if the goal is to protect famous 
trademarks, what the dilution statute was really enacted for, then it 
is unnecessary. 
When you fashion the argument in terms of likelihood of 
confusion as to source or sponsorship or approval, it’s something 
that courts are familiar with and know how to deal with.  So, it 
makes it a lot easier to frame an argument and present proof in a 
way that a judge or jury will find understandable, and it’s more 
likely to get you some relief. 
I believe another problem with the federal dilution statute is the 
wording of it because it’s not clear what is being protected.  It talks 
about “famous marks” and “distinctive marks,” but there is also a 
list of factors that courts are supposed to consider to decide 
whether a mark is distinctive.112  Many of them are also factors 
 
 110 Lanham Act § 43(a). 
 111 Lanham Act § 32. 
 112 FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§1125(c)(1) (2003)).  The FTDA states:  
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider 
factors such as, but not limited to— 
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; 
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or 
services with which the mark is used; 
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; 
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; 
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; 
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of 
trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the injunction is 
sought; 
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; 
and 
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the 
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. 
15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1). 
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courts routinely consider in deciding whether there is a likelihood 
of confusion, such as the trade channels that products are sold 
through or the nature and extent of use by third parties.113  So, I 
think that the statute is badly drafted. 
Lastly, there is a tremendous amount of uncertainty as to what 
needs to be proved.  It’s very nice to say that you need to prove 
actual dilution, but in the cases that have come down since 
Moseley, which have been decided on the merits and in general and 
where relief is granted under the dilution statute, there is also a 
claim under some other provision in the Lanham Act.114  The 
Lanham Act has provided a basis for relief through either section 
43(a), a counterfeiting provision, the anti-cyber-squatting section 
of the statute, or some other section.  So, it’s not really a case 
where the only issue has been blurring.  I think courts have been 
granting dilution injunctions since Moseley where there is blurring 
plus something else close to a likelihood of confusion.115  To me, 
that suggests that the dilution statute is really superfluous. 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: We’ll open it up now for questions 
about dilution or its history, or comments in favor or against 
dilution.  I thought I’d take advantage of my position as moderator 
to ask the first question because I’m desperately curious about this.  
What went wrong in the 1990s that led to the creation of the 
FTDA, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, which was passed into 
law in 1995?116  Most practitioners, even those who are in favor of 
anti-dilution protection, feel as though the FTDA was a disaster in 
one way or another.117  How did it go so poorly for the trademark 
 
 113 See 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1). 
 114 See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(claims of likelihood of confusion and dilution). 
 115 Cf. Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v. Seymour Mann, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 892, 
902 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (concluding that “[i]n view of the developing status of the law on 
the nature of evidence required, the court believes that the best course is to permit the 
plaintiff the opportunity to present its dilution claim to the jury”); Playtex Prods. v. 
Georgia-Pacific Inc., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1923 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2003) (refusing to 
grant injunction in the absence of any likelihood of confusion). 
 116 FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996). 
 117 See Bassam N. Ibrahim & Bryce J. Maynard, Recent Supreme Court Opinion Rules 
That the Federal Trademark Dilution Act “FTDA” Requires Proof of Actual Dilution, 
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Apr. 2003 (describing the surprise of many trademark veterans, 
academics, and commentators to the Supreme Court’s decision). 
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bar in the mid-1990s?  What went wrong in Congress?  Is there 
any explanation for the language of the FTDA? 
MS. DRISCOLL: I was involved in writing an amicus brief for 
the International Trademark Association.  We did a lot of research 
into the legislative history, what happened and how it happened.  I 
have to tell you it is a total mystery. 
Frankly, if there were a dilution statute, I would prefer one like 
New York’s, which is two sentences long and allows judges to 
interpret it under the principles of equity.118  That is how we got to 
where we are from the 1905 Act, the general sort of adapting to 
what is going on in the marketplace.  We were unable to find out 
just how this particular style of the statute evolved. 
MS. DEMPSEY: I think that a lot of the trouble was also in 
how the courts interpreted the statute.119  They were finding 
dilution where there were not famous and distinctive trademarks.  
And I think that when they started to get into niche markets, they 
were again finding relief for marks that were not distinctive or 
famous from the general public’s point of view.120  So, it was being 
used in more of a haphazard way, depending on the court you were 
in. 
Whereas I think that if you really stick to the notion that the 
FTDA is really intended to protect famous, distinctive trademarks 
and protect the selling power that Frank Schechter talked about in 
his article,121 it is important to have a manageable cause of action.  
Sometimes the courts were thinking too much into this. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I have a slightly different view.  I 
think the motivation for the federal dilution law came at least in 
part from international considerations.  The United States was 
seeking to get countries to protect famous marks under the TRIPS 
 
 118 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-l (McKinney 2003). 
 119 See Ibrahim & Maynard, supra note 117 (summarizing the “long-standing split 
between the United States Circuit Courts as to the level of proof necessary to succeed on 
a claim under the FTDA”). 
 120 See, e.g., Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 380 (Or. 1983) (holding 
that real estate developer’s “Wedgwood” trademark could be protected against dilution, 
finding it to be “locally famous” while conceding that it lacked national fame). 
 121 See Schechter, supra note 27, at 831. 
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Agreement.122  If you listen to intellectual property people from 
abroad, and Asian countries in particular, you hear the complaint 
that the United States is trying to force them through bilateral 
agreements (often today called Free Trade Agreements)  to enact 
high IP protection provisions that the United States, itself, does not 
have.  Many countries, especially those from the civil law 
tradition, expect to see explicit protection in national laws.  For 
protection of famous marks, the answer to these countries that in 
the United States you have to look at scattered state laws and case 
law requiring that marks be strong to be protected  is certainly not 
as persuasive as “Look, we have a federal statute that does exactly 
what we are asking you to do.”  Therefore, the federal dilution bill, 
whose origins were domestic, was perfect to meet this international 
need.  It had already been through legislative consideration in an 
earlier form.  It said “famous” in it.  It was literally a bill that fit 
the bill.123 
Thus, while domestic considerations—a perceived need for 
federal dilution protection—was the reason the original bill was 
drafted and introduced, I think that at least one factor that caused 
action and passage of the bill at that time was international in 
character. 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Yes? 
QUESTIONER: I have a question about confusion, about the 
difference between likelihood of dilution and actual dilution.  If 
you have to prove actual dilution under the FTDA and likelihood is 
not sufficient, and if the mere fact that a consumer mentally 
associates the junior user’s mark with a famous mark is not 
sufficient to establish actual dilution, and if blurring is not a 
necessary consequence of mental association or tarnishing, what 
act would prove actual dilution?  Would you have to show by 
survey or by a preponderance of persons in a survey that, in this 
case, they associated the tawdry goods shop with the Victoria’s 
Secret shop, when here they’re saying that blurring is not of 
 
 122 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 
81 (1994). 
 123 See 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1); see supra note 112. 
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consequence nor is tarnishing necessary to prove actual dilution?  
So, what would constitute it? 
MS. DRISCOLL: Well, the Supreme Court actually gave a 
couple of suggestions.  There was an expert that Victoria’s Secret 
retained, who testified generally about Victoria’s Secret’s business, 
the catalogues, the impact, and so forth.124  The Court, however, 
explained that the expert had nothing to say about the impact of the 
petitioner’s name on the strength of the respondent’s mark.125  I 
take that as a suggestion that in the future you are going to have 
marketing experts who are, under one theory or another, going to 
be testifying as to what the impact on the strength of the mark was 
through the adverse use.  I haven’t seen that yet in the cases, but 
there is a clear indication here that the Court is going to give us 
something. 
Second, consumer surveys can show actual dilution.  That was 
tried in a case involving Toucan Sam, who I gather is a Kellogg 
character.126  It is not famous enough to have reached me, but I 
gather it is children’s cereal or something. 
MS. PROGOFF: Froot Loops. 
MS. DRISCOLL: Okay.  I didn’t know Froot Loops. 
Anyway, that is one of the cases where there were surveys that 
tried to show a mark that had X fame or recognition before the 
defendant started using a toucanin this case it was on a golf 
cluband that the recognition afterwards was not as high.127 
The only reason, I gather, that Kellogg had a survey was 
because it is in the kind of company that does marketing surveys 
all the time.128  Obviously companies cannot go around measuring 
 
 124 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 424 (2003). 
 125 Id. at 419. 
 126 Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 127 Id. at 628 (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that defendants’ use of their toucan trademarks 
had caused the lessoning of the capacity of consumers to distinguish the goods offered by 
Kellogg). 
 128 See id. at 624 (noting that Kellogg has expended a “massive amount of time, money, 
and effort” in marketing Froot Loops); see also Michael Hess & Robert Mayer, Integrate 
Behavioral and Survey Research, MARKETING NEWS (Jan. 3, 2000) (explaining that 
Kellogg’s researchers are “trained to have both survey research skills and syndicated-
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the strength of their mark in case somebody infringes it tomorrow 
and then measure it again.  I mean, that gets to be crazy. 
In that case, the court held that you can’t prove that there was 
an effect merely because in the beginning Kellogg showed that X 
number of children recognized Toucan Sam as the spokesbird for 
Froot Loops.129  After the defendant started, they did the same kind 
of recognition surveythis time it happened to be among adults 
since they would be using the golf clubsand the recognition 
factor was not that much different.130  So, Kellogg’s attempt didn’t 
work.131  But that would be another way to do it—showing that the 
mark no longer means just Froot Loops or just a cereal. 
In the Moseley case, the Department of Justice filed an amicus 
brief suggesting ways to prove actual dilution through surveys.132  
It had the idea that a trademark signifies not just source but a group 
of indicia that consumers have come to associate with the product 
on which it is used.133  For example, Gerber on baby food means 
it’s good and wholesome.134  If somebody started using Gerber on 
some other totally different product with different characteristics, 
the government felt that you could show dilution by finding that 
people had different ideas about the characteristics of the product 
after the defendant started its use.135  They didn’t say “wholesome, 
good tasting” anymore.  They added something else that wouldn’t 
necessarily be a good thing for baby food.  It no longer meant the 
 
research skills”), available at http://www.promotiondecisions.com/articles/mktgnews/-
intrsrch.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). 
 129 Kellogg Co., 337 F.3d at 624 (citing survey information “indicating that 94% of 
Americans recognize Toucan Sam, and 81% of children who recognize him correspond 
him with Froot Loops”). 
 130 Id. at 628 (relying on customer surveys that showed no difference in consumer 
recognition of plaintiffs’ marks, both before and after the defendants’ use of the toucan 
mark on unrelated goods). 
 131 Id. at 627 (“Kellogg has presented no evidence of actual customer confusion.”). 
 132 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners in Part at 7–
8, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 01-1015). 
 133 See id. at 10. 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. (explaining that a trademark “seeks to assure a potential customer that a 
product with a particular mark is made by the same producer as other similarly marked 
items”). 
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indicia that surrounded the baby food; it meant something else as 
well.  But these are awfully difficult things to prove. 
QUESTIONER: Would part of that require that people who 
were surveyed before and after to prove the dilution of the mark be 
the same?  Because I could see a situation, for example, in which 
Gerber as being good for baby food, if the group surveyed were 
young mothers, would see it one way; meanwhile, if Gerber was 
suddenly adopted as a mark for a new brand of insecticide, and you 
were to go to industrial professional pesticide appliers, they would 
recognize Gerber as the world’s leading bug killer.  If I were to ask 
prior, “What does Gerber mean?” and I ask only young mothers 
and they say “baby food,” and then six months later, after Gerber 
comes out on the insecticide, I go only to pesticide appliers and 
say, “What do you associate with Gerber?” and they say “the 
world’s best pesticide,” that could be two disparate decisions and 
could lead to even more confusion if a court were to accept that 
type of evidence. 
MS. DRISCOLL: I agree.  The universe is a problem, as it is in 
all of these cases.  In the cases that have been decided since 
Moseley, these kinds of things that have been accepted as evidence 
of actual dilution. 
In one case, someone used the trademark in its domain name, 
and the plaintiff basically said, “Because of that, my mark can’t be 
exploited because I can’t use it in a domain name and therefore 
attract new customers, so you’ve lessened the value of the 
trademark because I can’t use a certain kind of marketing 
technique I otherwise could have.”136 
In another case, it was a counterfeit case, and that seems to me 
to be easyI mean, it obviously has affected everything about the 
plaintiff’s business.137 
In a third case, the Four Seasons Hotel had cut off a licensee, 
and the licensee continued to use the mark.138  As Susan said, 
obviously you’ve got likelihood of confusion there.  But the court 
 
 136 Cf. Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
 137 Cf. Nike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Ga. 2003). 
 138 Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268 
(S.D. Fla. 2003). 
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also held there was dilution, and it found actual harm to the 
trademark because a customer had written to Four Seasons to 
complain about the quality of the services at the defendant’s 
hotel.139 
I mean, these are things that are not strict dilution kinds of 
concepts.  So, the courts are trying to get away from the difficulty 
Moseley is presenting by looking at concepts that really aren’t 
dilution concepts and finding actual dilution. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: We should keep in mind that the 
Supreme Court in Moseley made it fairly clear that if the junior 
user uses the identical name, not just a similar name, that actual 
dilution could be demonstrated simply by the junior user’s use of 
the name.140  In the Gerber example, for instance, that would mean 
there would be actual dilution.  The problematical cases are those 
where the two marks are not identical.  Then the question is how 
far away from identical are the marks?  The further away the more 
problematical, and in Moseley they were quite different.  I think 
trademark owners should make more of that identical-mark dicta in 
Justice Stevens’ opinion.  One can hear whole discussions of 
Moseley by trademark attorneys with no mention of it. 
What is quite amazing is that Victoria’s Secret counsel, Walter 
Dellinger, volunteered during oral argument that the junior’s use of 
the name is not enough for dilution (after conceding that the 
likelihood of confusion standard was not appropriate under the 
FTDA).141  So, both parties before the Court and the Department of 
Justice as an amicus all agreed that just use would not be enough to 
 
 139 Id. at 1320–21. 
 140 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432–33 (“At least where the marks are not identical . . .  the 
mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a famous mark is 
not sufficient to establish actionable dilution.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 434 (“It 
may well be, however, that direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not 
be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence—
the obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are identical.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 141 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (No. 01-1015) 
(argued Nov. 12, 2002)  [hereinafter Moseley Oral Argument] (“QUESTION: Is 
likelihood of dilution enough?  MR. DELLINGER: No, not under the act and—and nor is 
just using the name enough . . . .”), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/-
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts.html (last updated Mar. 22, 2004). 
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prove actual dilution.  The fact that the Court under those 
circumstances sua sponte then put in the qualification on their own 
really showed how supportive the Court was of traditional dilution 
protection. 
I agree with Marie that an expert saying “there is dilution here” 
is going to be probably more than enough for most courts to find 
dilution.  I don’t think these cases are really decided on courts 
finding some sort of dilution, or even likelihood of confusion.  
They mostly figure it out “good guy, bad guy.”  Is someone free 
riding?  Is someone taking advantage?  If they do, they’ll say 
whatever they have to say. 
Take the Stork Club case in 1948.142  Here, there was obviously 
no confusion, yet the Court found confusion.143  Why?  Because 
the defendant was taking advantage of someone else’s goodwill, 
and if allowed to happen it would result in the dilution of the Stork 
Club mark and logo.144  The real key to winning a trademark case 
is to establish that you are the good guy, that the defendant is 
trying to do something with your goodwill without your 
permission, and that it is harmful to your mark.  If you get that 
point across, you are going to win in ninety-nine percent of the 
cases. 
Today, the real problem for trademark owners in dilution 
actions is the innocent infringer.  The person who has never heard 
of younot likely with a famous markbut this entity by 
definition is not a bad guy.  In this situation, courts tend to look to 
the doctrine and carefully apply the tests.  The dicta in Moseley 
about identical names and actual dilution become very important.  
In any case, innocent infringers are rare, usually are very small, 
 
 142 Stork Rest. Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948). 
 143 See id. at 358–59. 
 144 See id. at 356.  The case was brought under California Unfair Competition Law 
because “The Stork Club” was then considered only a trade name.  Today, it would be a 
common law trademark.  In any case, the Ninth Circuit noted that as a trade name it 
would receive the same protection as a trademark and, as noted above, found likelihood 
of confusion. See id. at 352.  The court also noted that unfair competition law was 
broader in reach than trademark law, but its conclusions as to confusion as to source 
supported traditional trademark infringement as well.  Today, there is no real difference 
between the reach of trademark law and unfair competition law. 
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and are not going to have the financial wherewithal to be able to 
litigate very far into the case. 
There are legitimate complaints about some of the dilution 
cases.  One reason is that the law has been applied as a catch-all 
for courts to get the bad guy, and this results in stretching dilution 
doctrine.  An example is in the broad application of tarnishment 
concept as demonstrated in Moseley.  A mark’s representation of 
quality only can be tarnished if the junior user’s mark is identical 
or very similar.  The same is true for the type of “whittling away” 
dilution that Frank Schechter envisioned in his 1927 article.145  
This point was that with the same mark on products or services 
from different sources the public will now be aware that there are 
different sources for goods with the mark.  The senior user’s mark 
then becomes less “distinctive” because its signal to the public that 
the senior user is the sole source of  any product with that mark is 
destroyed.  (“Distinctive” is just a term of art meaning “whether 
the design, [name, etc. is] likely to be understood as an indicator of 
the product’s source.)146 
There are costs to the consumer as well.  When two different 
producers use the same mark, even when there is no confusion, it 
increases search costs because now consumers are going to have to 
find out which of two or more producers is selling the product.  So, 
there are problems for the consumer, and there are problems for the 
brand owner. 
This scenario never happened nor was even threatened in the 
Moseley case.  No one looked at Victor’s Little Secret and said, 
 
 145 See supra note 27. 
 146 See, e.g., Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 378 (2d 
Cir.1997) (citing Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1008 (2d Cir.1995)).  
Thus, a “famous” mark, of necessity, would be distinctive.  After the Symposium, 
Professor Hansen noted that Judge Leval of the Second Circuit, normally very astute in 
intellectual property law, stated that a mark could be famous and not distinctive. See 
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999).  Professor Hansen 
further remarked that Judge Leval did not seem to realize that distinctiveness does not 
have the lay definition, but is a term of art for indication of source or origin and that this 
may explain his other “ridiculous conclusion that only inherently distinctive marks are 
subject to dilution protection.”  See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 
244 F. 3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 2001).  Judge Leval’s rule would mean one of the most famous 
marks in the world, Coca Cola, a descriptive mark with secondary meaning, would 
receive no protection against dilution. 
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“Oh my, there are now two different sources of goods using the 
same name.”  Victor’s Little Secret would never dilute Victoria’s 
Secret in the sense of making it less distinctive.  It was a play on 
words that would cause people to associate the two names, but not 
in the sense that they would now not know which was the source 
of goods in the future. 
For the district court in Moseley, Victor Moseley was a bad 
guy.  First, he lied about how he chose the name, and then he lied 
about not knowing of the Victoria’s Secret brand.147  He was 
“going down” no matter what.  The district court found dilution as 
a matter of law denying Moseley a trial on that issue.148  Summary 
judgment for the plaintiff in a trademark action of any kind is 
extraordinarily rare, and even more peculiar here where Victoria’s 
Secret did not have a strong dilution case to begin with. 
Now what did the Supreme Court do?  Did it find that dilution 
could be not be proven as a matter of law and dismiss the 
complaint?  No, it simply remanded the case back to the district 
court.149  In case anyone reading the case did not understand what 
that meant, Justice Kennedy in his concurrence stated that the 
“Court’s opinion does not foreclose injunctive relief if respondents 
on remand present sufficient evidence of either blurring or 
tarnishment.” 150  In short, Victoria’s Secret would start over with 
the right to prove dilution or tarnishment or both.  Moseley, after 
litigating through three levels of federal courts, would have to start 
over from the beginning before a hostile district court judge.  
Moreover, Justice Kennedy made clear to the district court and 
others that equity seeks to prevent harm and that a mark owner to 
obtain preliminary relief should not have to prove that harm 
already occurred.151  This, of course, provides a backdoor way to 
 
 147 See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1092 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 
9, 2000) (“The Moseleys assert that their selection of ‘Victor’s Secret’ for the name of 
their store was a complete coincidence.  They claim that they had never seen a Victoria’s 
Secret catalogue or a Victoria’s Secret advertisement prior to opening their store.”), aff’d, 
259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d and remanded, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 148 Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095–96. 
 149 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434. 
 150 See id. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 151 See id. at 435–36 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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retain the “likelihood of dilution” standard for preliminary 
injunctions. 
I do not think that in these “bad guy” cases, much evidence 
will be needed.  Justice Stevens, in the opinion of the Court, was 
very helpful to district courts wanting to find dilution when he 
stated that in Moseley there had been a complete lack of evidence 
of dilution.152  Plaintiff’s production of some evidence, therefore, 
could be enough for a court so inclined to distinguish Moseley.  
Certainly an expert who says that there has or will be dilution 
would be enough.  The courts who want to distinguish Moseley 
case are going to find ways to do so fairly easily.  The key for 
trademark owners is to demonstrate as a policy matter why they 
should distinguish Moseley. 
MS. DEMPSEY: I think the Toucan Sam case, though, was 
one where there was probably a little bit of overreaching on the 
part of Kellogg.153  I think there was some sort of overreaching on 
the part of Kellogg because the bird in that case was very different 
from the Toucan Sam that we know from Froot Loops.154  In fact, 
the court found that there was, first of all, no likelihood of 
confusion even though Kellogg had used a Toucan Sam on golf 
balls in a 1982 commercial.155  Where Toucan Sam was shown 
playing golf, there really wasn’t an association with golf; the Court 
found that people didn’t think of Toucan Sam as a golfer.156 
And then they went to the dilution theory and found that they 
hadn’t proved actual dilution.157  I think a lot of it had to do with 
the fact that the marks in that case were very, very different marks, 
that it wasn’t a personalized kind of toucan that was being used on 
the golf equipment that defendants had sold.158 
 
 152 See id. at 434 (“There is a complete absence of evidence of any lessening of the 
capacity of the Victoria’s Secret mark.”). 
 153 Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 154 Id. at 622. 
 155 Id. at 624–25. 
 156 See id. at 625. 
 157 Id. at 628. 
 158 See id. at 616. 
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And it was really just a husband-and-wife outfit in that case.159  
So, maybe that lends support to what you are saying. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Yes. 
MS. DEMPSEY: But I think also in that case it shows that you 
may have a case where you need a cause of action for dilution.  It 
was probably more a dilution cause of action than a likelihood of 
confusion cause of action.  But I believe the court was right in not 
finding either likelihood of confusion or dilution in that case.160 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I think one problem is that some 
trademark owners tend to overreach. 
MS. DEMPSEY: I don’t know if I would agree with that. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Present company excluded, of 
course.  But we do have some overbroad efforts by some 
trademark owners to stop the use of their marks. 
Overall it is important to keep in mind that courts in the United 
States provide the strongest protection in the world for trademarks.  
Regardless of doctrine, U.S. courts generally treat the goodwill in a 
trademark as a type of property interest.  If someone borrows or 
uses the goodwill in another’s mark for commercial advantage and 
without payment or authorization, courts generally will find a way 
to stop it. 
MS. PROGOFF: I think, consistent with what Hugh was just 
saying, some of the very early dilution cases after the federal 
statute was enacted were brought by people who really knew that 
they couldn’t prove a likelihood of confusion, so they brought a 
claim under the dilution statute instead.161  In most of those cases 
the plaintiffs lost.  I think courts were very unhappy with the 
statute.  That was kind of their first introduction to it—a lot of 
cases that really had no merit, but people were using it as a way to 
 
 159 Id. at 621. 
 160 See id. at 627–29. 
 161 See, e.g., Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc. 939 F. Supp. 340, 350 
(D.N.J. 1996) (that plaintiff’s mark  was “not famous and unworthy of protection under 
the new federal law”); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 
1559, 1574 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that “the First Amendment would apply to this use 
of the trademarks at issue, and that as an expressive use, this use [was] exempt from the 
reach of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act”). 
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get into court when they knew they didn’t have enough evidence to 
show likelihood of confusion.162 
QUESTIONER: Susan, I’m curious about something that you 
said.  I’m trying to figure out whether you think this is a good or 
bad idea.  When you talked about people having licensing 
programs and the fact that there’s a lot of money in that, it sounded 
like you were saying, “And oh, by the way, that could help you if 
somebody plunked your name on some unrelated goods because in 
fact you are licensing people to do that as well.” 
By the same token, it could be a very bad idea because it puts a 
burden on the license holders to monitor the quality of the things 
that carry their name.  At the same time actual dilution may be 
more difficult to prove, because, by allowing people to put your 
name on cars or whatever, you are diluting your own mark. 
MS. PROGOFF: There has been a lot of discussion about 
whether licensing is self-dilution.163  If you go back to what a 
trademark really is, it is supposed to be a symbol of a certain level 
of quality, whether the trademark is good, bad, medium, or 
whatever it is.164  The theory behind licensing is that whatever type 
of product you see  attached to a trademark on should be a 
consistent level of quality with the core products.165  They can be 
mid-market, high-market, low-market, whatever is appropriate. 
I’m not advocating a licensing program.  I think there are good 
reasons why trademark owners engage in licensing programs.  It is 
certainly something that can build a brand, but I wouldn’t do it 
simply to create a claim for dilution. 
 
 162 See Dr. Seuss Enters., 924 F. Supp. at 1573 (stating that a claim for dilution does not 
require a showing of a likelihood of confusion). 
 163 See, e.g., Michael Anthony Arciero, The Growing Risk of Self-Dilution, 12 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 213 (2001); Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 
2000, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 729 (2000); Elizabeth C. Bannon, The Growing Risk of Self-
Dilution, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 570 (1992). 
 164 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 3:10 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter MCCARTHY] (stating that the concept of 
trademarks as an indicator of a level of consistent quality emerged in the 1930s). 
 165 Pamela S. Chestek, Control of Trademarks by the Intellectual Property Holding 
Company, 41 IDEA 1, 26–27 (2001); see also Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and 
Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, J. POL. ECON. 1328 (1979). 
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What I was saying is that because there has been so much 
licensing over the last ten or fifteen years, consumers have come to 
expect that when a well-known trademark appears on something 
that is unrelated to the core product, that it is probably authorized 
or licensed.  That was really my point. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I’ve heard the argument a number of 
times that use of a mark on a number of products causes dilution.  
But this is not dilution.  Dilution has two qualities.  One, as Sue 
was saying, is a quality thing; but the other is as a source, meaning 
it comes from one sourceit can be five products coming from 
one source, but it’s still one source.  Dilution results not from a 
number of different products with the mark of one manufacturer, 
but rather from a number of different sources of products with the 
same mark. 
From a marketing point of view, there was the concept that it 
was ill- advised to sell different products with the same mark.  It 
“diluted” the brand’s strength, in a lay sense, to put it on different 
products.  So, Coke, for a long time the marketing people at Coke 
would not allow anything but the cola drink to use the mark.  It 
used Tab for a diet cola, for instance.166  The view was that Diet 
Coke would dilute Coke in terms of the commercial impression of 
what Coke means to the consumer.  But that’s a marketing concept, 
not a source-of-origin legal concept—and thus, not a dilution 
concept as we use it. 
Everyone knows Diet Coke comes from the same source as 
Coke.  It has not diluted the distinctiveness of Coke to have Diet 
Coke or Diet Vanilla Cokewhich is my favorite, by the wayor 
even Diet Lemon Coke, which is pretty good also.  And no one 
says, “Oh my heavens, you know what?  A lot of different people 
are using Coke now!”  No.  It’s Coke using the Coke mark on a 
number of different products.167 
 
 166 Coca-Cola did not expand its product line for seventy-five years until it introduced 
Sprite in 1961, Tab in 1963, and Fresca in 1966. See Coca-Cola, 1990–Now, available at 
http://heritage.coca-cola.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). 
 167 According to the Coca-Cola Web site, Coca-Cola produces nearly 400 beverage 
brands. See Coca-Cola, at http://www2.coca-cola.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). 
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PROFESSOR BEEBE: Hugh, I was wondering about 
something you said earlier, which is basically that dilution is 
misappropriation action, or a misappropriation of goodwill, and 
there are a lot of equity judgments on the part of the court, which 
consist of good guy and bad guy.  I’m unclear if this is a good 
thing or a bad thing in your view? 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I think it would take too long to 
answer that here in the dilution panel, but my short answer is that 
courts are right in protecting the goodwill a mark owner has built 
up from use by others without authorization for commercial 
purposes.  It goes back to how you view basic misappropriation 
principles—is it wrong to “reap where you have not sown.”  I 
generally agree that such reaping or free riding should be 
discouraged. 
And that’s what the courts have done.  For instance, in Europe 
in what they call the “badge of allegiance” cases, U.S. courts are 
highly protective.  They stop unauthorized sellers of tee-shirts, 
uniform jerseys, etc. with sports team names or individual players’ 
names on them.168  No consumer views the name on the shirt as 
necessarily indicating the source of the shirt.  For that one looks at 
the label in the back or the hang tag.  The reason courts stop 
unauthorized sellers is because they are using someone else’s 
goodwill.  The unauthorized sellers buy a tee-shirt for $2.00 and 
are selling it for $20.00.  They are selling $18.00 of goodwill that 
they didn’t create or pay for. 
In fact, courts will stop uses of another’s goodwill that are less 
blatant and more subtle as evidenced in the initial confusion or 
foot-in-the-door cases such as Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus 
Petroleum Corp.169  There, a company in the oil business called 
itself Pegasus, which in Greek mythology was the flying horse.  
For many years, Mobil Oil used a representation of that flying 
horse as a mark.  The defendant did not use a picture of the flying 
horse, but only the name for it, which Mobil did not use.170  In its 
 
 168 See Lucas G. Paglia & Mark A. Rush, End Game: The Ex Parte Seizure Process and 
the Battle Against Bootleggers, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 4, 8 (2002) (discussing 
likelihood of confusion in the context of bootlegging). 
 169 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 170 See id. at 256. 
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telephone solicitations the use of “Pegasus” was enough to get the 
other party to listen and not hang up thinking defendant might be 
affiliated in some way with Mobil Oil.171  Ultimately, the lack of 
affiliation was revealed, and there was no confusion from that 
point on.172  Nevertheless, the fact that Pegasus was able to get its 
foot in the door more readily because of the possible affiliation 
with Mobil was enough use of Mobil’s goodwill to constitute a 
trademark law violation.173 
A similar case was the proposed use of “McSleep” by Quality 
Inn, which upset McDonald’s.174  By the time someone actually 
drove up the driveway, they would know it’s not owned or 
affiliated with McDonald’s.175  What was Quality Inn doing?  It 
was using something, the Mc—— naming scheme that defined 
McDonald’s family of marks, without payment or authorization.  
Moreover, the chief executive of Quality Inn claimed that he had 
not seen the McDonald’s connection despite much evidence to the 
contrary.176  While a disclaimer would have protected McDonald’s 
completely from confusion, it would not have prevented the 
borrowing of its goodwill by Quality Inn.  Thus, it was enjoined. 
Moseley, in fact, was more in this category than a dilution case.  
The real crime was using the goodwill in some way for Moseley’s 
commercial advantage without payment or authorization.  There 
was no confusion and really no dilution, but Moseley borrowed or 
alluded to Victoria’s Secret in its name and that was enough, at 
least when coupled with the sleaze factor in the case.  The district 
court and the court of appeals found dilution as a matter of law 
granting summary judgment in a problematical dilution case.  And 
then, in the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, who is the most anti-
intellectual property justice on the Court, wrote a very measured, 
muted opinion in which he does not adopt any of the Fourth 
Circuit’s anti-dilution law rhetoric.177  He noted (1) that “Victoria’s 
 
 171 See id. at 259. 
 172 See id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Quality Inns Int’l v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988). 
 175 Id. at 220. 
 176 Id. 
 177 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
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Secret mark is unquestionably valuable;”178 (2) that Moseley did 
not challenge the fact that Victoria’s Secret is a famous mark;179 
and (3) that there was no contention “that the statutory protection 
is confined to identical uses of famous marks, or that the statute 
should be construed more narrowly in a case such as this 
[Victoria’s Secret/Victor’s Little Secret].180  These are all positive 
statements that support dilution protection. 
Moreover, the Court only remanded the case for further 
proceedings.181  That was not a win for Moseley nor a statement 
that dilution could not be proved after factual hearing either with 
regard to a preliminary injunction or a trial.  The way 
commentators speak of the case is that the Court rejected 
completely the dilution claims.  They only found that the record on 
the summary judgment motion did not support a finding of 
dilution. 
So, Moseley is much less of a problem for trademark owners 
than many trademark lawyers have claimed.  I think if most 
trademark owners pick the right cases and put in an expert, they 
are going to be okay in dilution cases. 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Actually, why don’t we move on now 
to Hugh on the future of protection against dilution.  Then we can 
follow up with some more questions. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I think I might have already made all 
of my points.  I will summarize, though. 
First, it is important to keep in mind that there are still state 
laws which only require a strong mark and the likelihood of 
dilution. 
Second, Justice Stevens’ opinion, as discussed, is actually more 
narrow than is commonly perceived. 
Third, also as discussed, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is very 
helpful to trademark owners, and that, of course, is what he wanted 
 
 178 Id. at 432. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. at 434. 
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to accomplish.182  His opinion is something trademark owners can 
cite to district courts to make them more comfortable with finding 
dilution and tarnishment, particularly in the preliminary injunction 
context. 
Fourth, I think Supreme Court opinions in intellectual property 
cases historically have had little impact upon what happens in the 
day-to-day litigation in the district courts and courts of appeals.  
This is true for a number of reasons but that is a whole article by 
itself. 
Finally, Moseley has presented trademark owners with a good 
reason to urge Congress to revise the FTDA, particularly to change 
the dilution standard to “likelihood of dilution.”  Congress has 
been supportive in the past and could easily see the need to do 
something in light of Moseley. 
MS. DEMPSEY: I think there will be a period where 
trademark owners will look at the post-Moseley cases to determine 
whether they are getting the protection they want or need under 
circumstantial evidence for the famous and distinctive marks.  
Here, to the extent that marks are the same, maybe the testimony of 
marketing experts can be used to show actual dilution. 
If the courts protect the marks and trademark owners feel that 
they are getting the protection they need, there probably won’t be 
any kind of amendment to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.  To 
the extent that there isn’t, I think maybe there will be an impetus 
on the part of trademark owners to introduce new legislation.  I 
know that the International Trade Association already has come up 
with two different amendments to the dilution act.183  Then there 
would be a real impetus to have Congress act and make 
amendments to the dilution act. 
MS. DRISCOLL: Can I ask you, Hugh, what you think of the 
remarks by the Supreme Court on tarnishment?  It says, whether 
tarnishment is actually embraced by the statutory text is another 
 
 182 Id. at 435 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 183 See, e.g., FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2003)). 
2 PANEL I FORMAT 8/6/2004  2:57 PM 
2004] MOSELEY AND BEYOND 885 
 
matter.184  The Court continues, “Indeed, the contrast between the 
state statutes, which expressly refer to both ‘injury to business 
reputation’ and to ‘dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade 
name or trademark,’ and the federal statute which refers only to the 
latter, arguably supports a narrower reading of the FTDA.”185 
This suggests that there is no tarnishment claim under FTDA as 
it is presently written.  Of course, tarnishment was one of the key 
things that dilution used to protect under state law.186 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Yes.  I think Stevens says 
“arguably.”  Moreover, Scalia made the point at oral argument.187  
But note that the remand does not attempt to rule out any dilution 
argument including tarnishment below, and Kennedy in his 
concurrence explicitly states that on remand that plaintiffs are 
entitled to injunctive relief if they prove tarnishment.188  Moreover, 
counsel for Moseley agreed in oral argument that the FTDA action 
allows a tarnishment claim.189 
Stevens states that “[m]ental association does not establish 
tarnishment.”190  Of course, that’s just a truism, and not 
problematical.  He mentions that the military officer made a mental 
association, “but did not therefore form any different impression of 
the store that his wife and daughter had patronized.”191  He doesn’t 
say whether that comment is meant to apply to the tarnishment 
 
 184 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432 (“Petitioners have not disputed the relevance of 
tarnishment, presumably because that concept was prominent in litigation brought under 
state antidilution statutes and because it was mentioned in the legislative history.  
Whether it is actually embraced by the statutory text, however, is another matter.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 185 Id. 
 186 See generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 164, § 24:104. 
 187 See Moseley Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 5 (“[The] words of the statute refer 
to distinctiveness of a mark.  They don’t refer to tarnishment.”); see also id. at 46 (“[The 
statutory definition of dilution] does not at all cover disparaging the other product.”). 
 188 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Court’s opinion does not 
foreclose injunctive relief if respondents on remand present sufficient evidence of either 
blurring or tarnishment.”). 
 189 See Moseley Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 17 (“QUESTION: . . . [Y]ou do not 
contest that tarnishment is a—basis for the respondent to prevail in this case?  MR. 
HIGGINS: We do not.”). 
 190 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434. 
 191 Id. at 435. 
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argument, although I think that is what he is talking about.  Of 
course, there was no preliminary injunction hearing or trial below 
and the facts were not fully explored. 
But that being said I do not think there was tarnishment in the 
dilution sense in this case.  No one was going to think that the 
quality of what Victoria’s Secret mark stands for as a result of  
Victor’s Little Secret means anything less because the association 
between the two names was not of the type that exists in a dilution 
case.  So, I certainly cannot find fault with what the Court did by 
saying that tarnishment was not proved as a matter of law. 
Nor do I have any trouble as a theoretical matter with Scalia’s 
recurring point of view that if Congress wants something in the 
law it should clearly put it into the statute; that language in 
committee reports does not substitute for language in the statute.192  
When Congress does not put something clearly in the statute, his 
view is that courts should not place it there.  Here, it was probably 
the intent of Congress to include those claims that were available 
under state dilution law, but they did not make that explicit.  The 
problem with Scalia’s view is that as a practical matter it often 
would produce results at odds with congressional intent, and 
Congress would not be able to move the legislative machinery in a 
way to correct statutory language in the many instances that would 
result from Scalia’s approach. 
But you certainly have tarnishment in state law, don’t you? 
MS. DRISCOLL: Some states. 
MS. PROGOFF: I think a lot of the cases that have involved 
tarnishment have been decided under state dilution statutes.  A lot 
of them come down as parody cases.  If the judge thinks it’s funny, 
then usually there is no injunction.  If the judge is offended in 
some way, then there is.  But I think most of those cases have been 
 
 192 Moseley Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 46 (“QUESTION: Nothing could be 
clearer than that Congress adopted a definition . . . that does not at all cover disparaging 
the other product.  MR. DELLINGER: Well, it—Congress thought otherwise.  The 
House report say that the definition—  QUESTION: The House committee thought 
otherwise.  MR. DELLINGER: Yes.  QUESTION: What Congress thought was the 
definition [in the statute] that Congress adopted.”). 
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decided under the state statutes, and it remains to be seen what will 
happen with them now. 
MS. DRISCOLL: We have one case that a friend of mine sent 
me that was decided in the district court in Illinois last week, in 
which the court held that Moseley “discussed only blurring, 
although it did leave open the question of whether tarnishment is 
within the scope of § 43(c).”193  The court then raised the issue of 
whether actual dilution would have to be shown for tarnishment 
cases if in fact tarnishment cases were still covered under the 
statute.194  So, it’s obvious that courts are having a little bit of 
difficulty figuring out what law they are supposed to apply under 
the federal statute. 
In that case, by the way, the plaintiff didn’t get anyplace on its 
motion for a temporary restraining order.195  It involved Caterpillar 
Tractor.196  Caterpillar Tractor sued Walt Disney because the 
villains were driving Caterpillar tractors in a TV program for 
children.197  The allegation was on the tarnishment issue because 
those children are never going to think of Caterpillar tractors as 
good things anymore as a result of  the tractors being driven by the 
villains.198 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: That raises an issue that I’m desperate 
to introduce, even at this late time, into the conversation.  That is, 
what about the First Amendment side of dilution protection and the 
limitations on expression?199  I mean, if it is true that judges are 
just ruling on sort of off-the-cuff misappropriation basis“who’s 
the good guy, who’s the bad guy?”that is sort of circular in a 
sense.  I mean, you are calling them a bad guy because they are 
breaking the law, but you are saying they are breaking the law 
because they are a bad guy.  Where is the law on this issue? 
 
 193 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (citing 
Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (2003)). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 916. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 918. 
 198 Id. 
 199 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Okay, maybe in the commercial context we can figure it out on 
efficiency concerns.  But in the First Amendment or expression 
context, it is terrifying that these companies can claim tarnishment 
and limit parodies of their products, in addition to limiting the uses 
of their products in political speech. 
Dilution seems to be expanding in scope enormously both in its 
subject matter and in the scope of protection it provides.  What is 
the implication then for free speech, or how can it be defended on 
those grounds?  What comments, if any, do you have on that issue? 
MS. DRISCOLL: You know, I think the parody takes care of 
that.  It has been my perceptionI don’t know what other people 
thinkthat recently courts have been more likely to find parody 
and no injury to the trademark owner than they used to be.  They 
are saying, “Come on, do you have a sense of humor?” or “Please, 
this isn’t really affecting you, it’s obvious parodying.”  I think the 
cases are going more and more to the First Amendment side of the 
balance. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Well, I don’t know.  The Deere case 
in the Second Circuit seemed to present facts that implicated the 
First Amendment.200  Judge Jon Newman nevertheless found 
tarnishment in a comparative ad that could be construed as a 
parody without even discussing the First Amendment.201  
Ironically, Newman would be exactly the type of judge you would 
expect to consider the First Amendment, and he did not.  The fact 
that it was a comparative ad meant to gain a competitive 
commercial advantage against John Deere probably made the 
difference, although I do not think it should have.202 
On the First Amendment question there is one case that is 
incredibly overbroad and problematical.  In World Wrestling 
Federation Entertainment, Inc.  v. Bozel,203 defendants blamed 
plaintiff, World Wrestling Federation, for the deaths of four 
children, calling the plaintiffs “criminal” and “evil.”204  The court 
 
 200 Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 201 See id. at 45 
 202 See id. at 41. 
 203 142 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 204 See id. at 528. 
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held that these actions fell within a claim for dilution for 
tarnishment.205  The defendants were not in business and did not 
produce any product.  This was a perfect vehicle to discuss the role 
of the First Amendment in dilution and tarnishment claims, and 
there was none. 
So, I agree that the First Amendment should play a bigger role.  
Unfortunately, when judges and juries look at these cases they do 
not appear to have any thought of the First Amendment.  They 
seem to just look at the two parties, figure out if somebody is 
hurting someone else, and determine what should be done about it.  
Justice Breyer raised First Amendment issues at oral argument, but 
the counsel for Moseley surprisingly deflected the helpful question 
with the statement that “there really isn’t a public interest that is 
being expressed or applied here.”206  Likewise, there was little 
interest in this issue from the other justices. 
And this type of approach is not limited to trademark law 
where it could be argued that the First Amendment issues are 
tangential.  In defamation cases, where the First Amendment 
provides tremendous protection for defendants, the defendants 
nevertheless often lose at the trial level.  The judge or jury see a 
plaintiff harmed through very hurtful remarks that are normally 
untrue.  On the other hand, they see defendants, perhaps elitist, 
lazy, negligent, arrogant, or all four, relying upon the doctrinal 
defense of a lack of a demonstration of malice.  Yet, where no 
malice has been demonstrated, do the defendants then win?  No, 
they often lose at the trial level because they were the bad guys.  If 
you are representing media defendants, you really must create your 
record for the appellate courts because you often will need them to 
apply the defamation law in the way it was intended.  I think it is 
the same in dilution cases such as Moseley where the defendant is 
viewed as a bad guy by the lower courts. 
As to parody, what I think it comes down to is if the court likes 
the parody, then it’s protected; if it doesn’t like the parody, then it 
is not protected; and if it is pornographic, at least up until now, it 
won’t like it.  This may change in more “enlightened” days.  I 
 
 205 See id. at 529. 
 206 See Moseley Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 18. 
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don’t know if we will have more enlightened days, and I don’t 
know if it would change even then. 
But in analyzing Moseley, it is good to consider what if there 
had not been pornographic movies, sex toys, and related “adult” 
items in the back of Victor’s Little Secret—would Victor Moseley 
have lost below?  If the head of JAG at Fort Knox had not been 
“personally offended by” Victor’s Little Secret and had not written 
to Victoria’s Secret, would Victoria’s Secret have even brought the 
case?  What if the store had been selling men’s traditional 
underwear?  While dilution doctrine would say there is no 
difference, if Victor’s Secret had been selling men’s underwear, I 
think it would have been more clear to everyone that the 
significant difference in the names meant that this really was not a 
dilution case at all for the reasons I discussed before. 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: I wonder, just quickly, about your 
opinion of Judge Leval’s trademark jurisprudence.207  This is a 
Second Circuit audience, Second Circuit location.  Leval has 
established the requirement that a trademark must be “inherently 
distinctive” in order to receive anti-dilution protection.208  As New 
York lawyers what are your views of that? 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I already have said that I think it’s 
ridiculous.209  Coke, which acquired distinctiveness for Coca Cola, 
which was a cola drink originally made from a cocoa leafmaybe 
still is, I don’t know, it gives me a lift.  To say that because it was 
not inherently distinctive it is not protected from dilution makes 
absolutely no sense and certainly thwarts the objectives of the 
FTDA.  Judge Leval misread the statute and misunderstood what 
“distinctive” in the trademark sense means. 
MS. DRISCOLL: Well, the statute talks about distinctiveness, 
whether it is acquired or not acquired. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Yes. 
MS. DRISCOLL: So, I don’t know how he can get around the 
fact that one of the factors in determining whether there is 
 
 207 See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 208 See id. at 215 (establishing that the mark be distinctive among the elements to state a 
claim for dilution). 
 209 See supra note 146. 
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protection is the extent of either inherent or acquired 
distinctiveness.  He ignored that completely. 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: But the Supreme Court does cite 
Nabisco in footnote number 5 of the Moseley opinion.210  A student 
came into my office a week or two ago and based on that footnote, 
the student was under the opinion that of course the Supreme Court 
endorsed Laval’s “inherent distinctiveness” requirement. 
MS. DRISCOLL: No, no, but he didn’t have that requirement 
in Nabisco.211 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Okay. 
MS. DRISCOLL: In that one, he gave protection for dilution 
even though it was acquired distinctiveness.  A few years later, he 
wrote the opinion in The Children’s Place case where he included 
the requirement that it had to be inherently distinctive.212 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Okay. 
MS. DRISCOLL: He wrote both of them. 
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Okay, great.  I think that concludes this 
panel.  Thanks very much to the panelists for this excellent 
discussion. 
 
 
 210 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 427 n.5. 
 211 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216 (holding that plaintiff’s claim to stop defendant’s 
injunction was denied after defendant proved that dilution of its product was likely). 
 212 See TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Communications Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
